The Boeing And Faa Safety Risks Assessment

The Boeing and FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Safety Risks Assessment


Recently, numerous regulatory documents happen to be adopted in the particular field of municipal aviation safety, each internationally and country wide. Moreover, there will be a continuous enhancement in the type of aircraft to boost the amount of passenger security. Frequently , this enhancement can also be attributed in order to the level associated with disruptive innovations.

Meanwhile, aviation specialists all over the world talk regarding the technical issues of the Boeing 737 MAX, which usually resulted in the particular death of 346 people in 6 months. Within the papers, based on the particular analysis of the particular Lion Air 610 accident, pyschological data reports that will the lack associated with proper coordination among the efforts associated with regulators and the actions of aircraft manufacturers can lead to tragic results and an imbalance of the entire integrated safety management system.


Improving flight safety in the global air transport system is the fundamental and most important strategic goal of both the International Civil Aviation Organization and all national regulators. Despite some improvement in recent years, the state of flight safety in civil aviation is not always satisfactory (Kuklev, Shapkin Filippov, and Shatrakov, 2019). Nevertheless, as practice shows, despite the availability and constant updating of safety standards, national regulators do not always properly fulfill their responsibilities.

For example, questions to the American aviation regulator arose after the crash of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 in Ethiopia in early March 2019. Earlier, a crash with a plane of a similar type occurred in Indonesia. Shortly thereafter, regulators from all countries suspended the flights of the Boeing 737 MAX 8.

According to experts, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 may have problems with the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, MCAS. U. S. media reported that during the tests, the FAA provided broad authority to evaluate the safety of Boeing itself, which raises questions about the objectivity of the tests (Keane and German, 2019).

The main issue at the hearing was how closely the regulator checked the new aircraft before permitting its operation in March 2017. In this regard, it appears appropriate in order to consider the requirements and causes from the situation that resulted in the occurrence of the risk event (plane crash), as nicely as its ramifications for further progress safety risks evaluation and safety excuse controls.

Background and Literature Review

The methodology with regard to calculating the dangers of negative effects as a result of the working conditions of modern aviation equipment (control mistakes, a manifestation associated with the human element, etc. ) will be based on the physical interpretation associated with the concept associated with risk in the particular form of “Risk ‑ possible risk, ” i. electronic., predicted if feasible conditions for that event of a danger event are discovered (Kuklev, Shapkin, Filippov, and Shatrakov, 2019). Also, it will be based on concealed threats depending upon the residual danger inherent within the program at the phases of development plus production of modern aviation equipment.

The key issues would be the systematization and organization of the partnership as well as the nature associated with phenomena in conditions of the pursuing: challenge, threat, risk, security, condition, aspects, risks, security degree, acceptable and focus on levels of protection and risks, security management, risk management, risk factors, chains of random events.

The basis of the scheme under consideration is the basic principles of risk theory and the procedures for expert analysis and assessment of the negative consequences of danger factors in aviation operations based on risk assessment matrices using the ICAO methodology (Macrae, 2014). At the same time, in the triad of control actions (reactive, proactive, predictive), the main thing is to take proactive measures to change the state of the system before the predicted dangerous event occurs.

Moreover, the methods of expert risk analysis of the occurrence of negative scenarios of events using “risk analysis matrices” are of particular importance. This is the essence and universality of an unified approach to assessing safety through risks (Oster, Strong, and Zorn, 2013). The aviation management safety management system implements the principles of risk calculation and management based on two functional systems (Macrae, 2014; Stolzer and Goglia, 2016):

  • The first subsystem implementing the initial procedure “Identification of risks and risk factors. ”
  • In subsystem No. 2, based on the base of risk factors and identifiable types of risk, it is possible to provide risk management and prevention of negative situations by the recommendations of ICAO, IATA, and other regulatory documents.
  • The safety management system for aviation activities consists of separate modules. They, in turn, make it possible to fully assess the level of security by identifying you will of adverse solitary and rare occasions with a little sample of data that may lead to negative situations, take measures to eliminate and prevent them.

    This, in turn, evidently should increase the level of safety (Medicine National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, et al., 2018). Accordingly, a failure in one of the subsystems can lead to the breakdown of the entire aviation safety management system, which happened in the Boeing 737-MAX catastrophe, being a clear sign of the FAA’s internal problems.

    Examination of the chronology of events will help to understand the essence of the problem and the reasons for its occurrence. The final report states that on the early morning of October 29, 2018, Lion Air’s 610 flight departed from Jakarta, Indonesia, with 189 people on board (Petchenik, 2019). It was the new 737 MAX 8, which operated only four weeks, the latest design within the Boeing collection of aircraft produced back in the particular 1960s. Take-off plus ascent to the height of around one, 600 feet (480 meters) were regular (Petchenik, 2019).

    After that, because another investigative function reports, the fliers removed the flaps; at this stage, the aircraft suddenly sank to nine hundred feet (270 meters) (Langewiesche, 2019). “During radio conversations along with air traffic remotes, pilots reported the “problem using the handle system” and requested for data on the altitude and velocity displayed on the particular screens of controllers’ radars” (Petchenik, 2019, para 8).

    Equipment in the particular cockpit gave risky readings; pilots drawn out the flaps and climbed in order to 5, 000 feet (1,500 meters), but after retracting the flaps, the nose of the aircraft sank and it began to lose altitude again (Petchenik, 2019, p. 76). Over the next six to seven minutes, the pilots fought with the aircraft ‑ they tried to maintain the level of the nose, but the automatic flight control system constantly lowered it down (Petchenik, 2019, p. 69). In the end, the plane ‘won’ and crashed into the water at high speed and all those on board died.

    The second accident occurred, when Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed six minutes after taking off from Addis Ababa, resulting in 157 people died (Campbell, 2019). The aircraft was also MAX 8, and it was operated only for two months; pilots reported control problems, and satellite observation data showed sharp altitude fluctuations (Campbell, 2019).

    Due to the evident similarity with the above-mentioned Lion Air accident, a question was raised: if the same malfunction or a design defect caused both incidents, then there may be other accidents. In a few days, the 737 MAX fleet was suspended from flying on global scales, in many countries (Langewiesche, 2019). The data recovered from the accident on Flight 302 reinforced the suspicion that the two accidents were closely related. On both lethal flights, the new automated MCAS maneuvering correction system was designed to avoid incidents; instead, it sent planes twice at a fatal peak.

    The ‘history’ of flight 610 Lion Air accident can be traced by the data extracted from the black box (Lakew, 2019). The chart shown in Physique 1 below has been published as component of the initial report of the particular National Transport Security Committee of Philippines.

    Lakew, examining the situation, notes that will a general concept of the incident ‘deploying’ is given by the height monitoring curve at the particular bottom of the particular graph (Lakew, 2019). The first ascent will be interrupted by the sharp descent; after that, the further excursion is accompanied by the long, erratic “rollercoaster ride” (Lakew, 2019).

    Finally, there exists a dive, a small more than ten seconds the plane descends 5, 500 feet. The incident report states that will “all these razor-sharp ups and lows were caused simply by the movements associated with the horizontal backing ‑ a small wing-like surface at the rear of the fuselage” (Petchenik, 2019, p. 78). The stabilizer controls the pitch angle of the aircraft, i. e., to where the nose is directed. On the Boeing 737, it does this in two ways: the elevator steering trimmer mechanism tilts the entire stabilizer; at the same time, the movement of the pilot control wheel moves the elevator ‑ a movable steering wheel at the rear of the stabilizer (Petchenik, 2019, p. 36-37).

    In both cases, moving the back of the surface up causes rising the nose of the aircraft, and opposite; the commands given to the system of elevator trimmer and how they affected the aircraft are presented by three curves based on the flight data in Fig. 1 (Lakew, 2019). The line marked “trim manual” (blue) reflects the actions of fliers, “trim automatic” (orange) shows commands from your electronic systems from the aircraft, and “pitch trim position” (dark blue) shows the particular tilt of the particular stabilizer (Lakew, 2019).

    A increased position on the particular chart indicates the command to boost the particular nose. This is how the particular struggle between people and machine will be evident. Thus, the particular cause of the particular incorrect behavior associated with the automatic message balancing system has been identified namely within the MCAS of the particular new system associated with the 737 MAXIMUM model series.

    The design mistake is the foundation for the incident. Throughout the development plus further certification associated with the system, developers did not correctly study the possibility of losing handle of the plane and failed to place any fuse within the MCAS in the event of failure. Recent within aircraft systems are not even reflected within the safety assessment that will Boeing provided towards the FAA. As the result, the federal government agency could not really fully analyze the particular operation of the particular MCAS system.

    Only following the accident of the Boeing-737 MAX of the particular Indonesian Airline Big cat Air on Oct 29, 2018, the particular FAA learned that will the system, skipping the pilot, can shift the backing not by zero. 6 degrees, as with the report, yet by as very much as 2. five; moreover, it may get it done several occasions (Shepardson and Manley, 2019).

    In addition, it had been that will it relied around the data of 1 angle of assault sensor, which upon the crashed aircraft was faulty. None of them of the technicians knew about the particular new limits, yet the most critical thing is that many pilots learned about the existence of MCAS only after the first crash.

    The Case of Boeing 737-MAX from the Standpoint of Safety Risks Assessment and Safety Mitigating Controls

    Today, many aviation administrations in the world, together with carriers, are developing new ways to manage safety in air transport. The principles of exposure to existing risks are being introduced not only in the financial activities of aircraft operators but also in production units.

    The most promising areas are the development and implementation of risk management programs in the safety management system. In this regard, existing methods for the quantitative assessment of flight safety receive a fresh stage of development. At present, the levels of flight safety and airworthiness are determined by the statistics of events (aircraft accidents, incidents, failures, malfunctions, etc. ). This approach gives a clear picture of the level of safety at the enterprise when comparing it with the previous period.

    A modern approach to solving the problem of improving flight safety involves the development of a safety management system for each airline, and the basis of the system is the safety risk management process. At the same time, however, the concept of indicators of an acceptable safety level is interpreted differently, depending on the available/applied methods for their assessment and the ways of implementation in the flight safety system.

    At present, preset safety levels and safety indicators are determined not functionally and often with distorted pronounced models describing their contextual contents, as well as ways to integrate them into the airline’s safety management system (Musa and Wu, 2017). Thus, the inadmissibility of giving safety risks assessment and safety mitigating controls to airlines or aircraft manufacturers is obvious.

    The process of transferring responsibility for aircraft to manufacturers has been in the United States for many years. Thus, they hoped to reduce the number associated with bureaucratic procedures whilst coordinating the style of new versions. However, in the particular end, namely, this particular allowed manufacturers in order to challenge safety regulating claims. The finale of the procedure was the authorization for Boeing through FAA to disregard in 2014 a number of requirements for the particular onboard crew caution system (§25. 1322, Boeing 737 Maximum certification documents).

    In turn, Boeing had a valid reason not really to focus upon the characteristics of the particular new aircraft. 1 of the important marketing benefits associated with the Boeing-737 MAXIMUM is the fast retraining of fliers of the previous-generation Boeing-737 NG, preserving airlines millions associated with dollars in re-training. It essentially comes down to an hour-long familiarization on the pill screen, even without having flying with an airplane simulator.

    Namely, for this (and speeding up certification) Boeing went in order to break its lengthy tradition ‑ in order to maintain full power over the pilot on the aircraft. One associated with the tasks associated with MCAS was going to create the Boeing-737 MAXIMUM behave like the Boeing-737 NG, in spite of the engines becoming significantly large plus very advanced (Keane and German, 2019). According to specialists, these critical defects were present within a report authored by the Boeing designers (Campbell, 2019):


    • Four times underestimated possible angle of deviation of the aircraft stabilizer to dive by the MCAS system;
    • It was not indicated that the system can be reactivated after each pilot reaction. This did not allow assessing the real risk of the aircraft entering a dive;
    • The threat of malfunctioning of the system below the “catastrophic” level. However , even with a “dangerous” threat level, the MCAS system did not have to rely on data from a single sensor.
  • Four times underestimated possible angle of deviation of the aircraft backing to dive simply by the MCAS program;
  • It had not been pointed out that the program can be reactivated after each initial reaction. This do not allow evaluating the real likelihood of the aircraft getting into a dive;
  • The threat of not working of the program under the “catastrophic” degree. Nevertheless , even along with a “dangerous” danger level, the MCAS system failed to possess to rely upon data from the single sensor.
  • The incidents became an event with regard to lawmakers to indicate defects in the present regulatory system, which usually gave manufacturers as well much freedom. In this case, even if there are strong doubts regarding security, FAA officials should conduct an investigation or inspection to substantiate their opinion (which could potentially take a long time). Only then can they regain control of what is happening. However, airline managers intercepted the regulatory functions of the regulator.


    In addition to self-eliminating the FAA from regulatory intervention, in this case, it should be noted that Boeing itself gained one of the biggest victories in lobbying ‑ thanks to the aircraft manufacturer, a law was passed that effectively suspended the US government from approving new aircraft projects. In fairness, it must be said that the FAA explicitly stated that the current legislative regulation does not contribute to security (Keane and German, 2019, para 4).

    The FAA also expressed concern that the new rules are turning it into fiction, as it can only intervene after “the plane crashes and people die” (Timmons and Frost, 2019) ‑ characteristically, that is exactly what turned out be.

    The fact that the transfer of control to aircraft manufacturers will make them more competitive compared to foreign companies, primarily the French Airbus, Boeing, and its industry organizations have been talking about since 2014. According to industry lobbyists, the FAA allegedly arbitrarily interpreted the rules, slowing the development process (Timmons and Frost, 2019).

    To solve this problem, representatives of aviation manufacturers advised lawmakers to expose a delegation program just like the European 1 ‑, for instance, checking of minor elements of Western aircraft, such as bathrooms and seats, can be outsourced (Taneja, 2017). This shortens the certification process and benefits Airbus and other competing Boeing companies.

    However, the freedom granted led to a feeling of complete own rightness, impunity, and negligence. In the situation with MCAS, as noted above, the Boeing developers acted very unconventionally ‑ they did not inform anyone about this new product. Before the Indonesian disaster, neither the pilots, nor the technical services, nor the airline leaders knew about this program.

    Not only that, the system is designed so that the program was hard to detect: MCAS turned on silently when the computer seemed to comprehend that the nose pulled up too hard, worked for several seconds, directing the plane to the ground, and then went back into sleep mode until the next critical, according to the computer, mode.


    Most experts agree that the Boeing corporation, perhaps seeking to win a competitive race with Airbus, has relied on the modernization of the Boeing 737, which first took off in 1967. The plane was very successful, which made it possible to modernize it many times. However , improvements and an increase in the size of the aircraft led to the fact that the original model with its excellent flight characteristics and a well-thought-out control system began to be equipped with new wings, more powerful engines, lengthening the fuselage to accommodate more passengers.

    All this led to the fact that the new aircraft was less stable, and to keep it in the air, a growing number of “crutches” were required. One of all of them was the MCAS electronic system, that ought to take the nasal area from the aircraft straight down when it is raised in order to a dangerous position, behind that the booth begins. Regarding this, specialists have a query: is there as well much electronics within the control associated with modern aircraft, due to the fact of which they turned into “flying laptops. ”

    According to statistics, up to 85 percent of air crashes are due to the human factor (Stolzer and Goglia, 2016). However, technology also fails, because, in its development, there is also a human factor influence. In particular, in modern aircraft, Fly-by-wire technology is increasingly being used. Such systems first appeared on the Airbus A320 in the late 1980s (Kisesa, 2016).

    Its essence is simple: instead of mechanical control methods (cables, hydraulic lines, transmitting power amplifiers), electric drives controlled by a computer and connected simply by wire are used, from where the name of the technology comes from. The advantages are obvious: the aircraft becomes much easier, cheaper, and more reliable, including in terms of protection from the human factor. The more aircraft systems that are usually controlled exclusively simply by a computer, the greater things an hands-off can do (Wilson and Binnema, 2014).

    For instance, it is far from only managing the direction, velocity, and altitude associated with the flight, but additionally at the correct time, releasing the particular flaps in the correct angle, then your getting gear, activating automated braking, that will be, ultimately completing the fully automatic getting without the involvement of the pilot. It will be enough to remotely download the parameters to the computer route and desired approach pattern.

    However, by analogy, one should recall the cases of accidents, including fatalities, in which Tesla unmanned vehicles fell, deprived of the option of “manual” control of the driver. In the event of any emergency, the onboard computer operates according to the algorithms laid down in it, which, however , cannot provide for all possible combinations of factors in each emergency, due to which the actions of the autopilot may turn out to be erroneous.

    At the same time, if on the roads, it is a risk to the life and health of one or several people, in civil aviation, hundreds of human lives are “at stake, ” which are increasingly dependent on the algorithms and program codes of electronic aircraft automatic control systems.

    Conclusion and Further Implications

    Despite all the regulatory “ups and downs, ” the consideration of the case of the Lion Air 610 air crash involving the Boeing 737-MAX clearly shows that the pilots became very dependent on autopilots and other computerized flight control systems. Abuse of on-board automation can lead to a loss in the ability of pilots to quickly respond to emergencies in which an aircraft can get. In addition, improper operation of automation itself can lead to emergencies.

    At the same time, the systems of modern aircraft cannot accurately predict the danger and make the right decision for the given situation. In other words, excessive reliance on automation threatens the plane and its travellers.

    Pilots grew to become determined by automation, plus this dependence has been supported both simply by themselves to relieve stress during the particular flight, through air carriers in an try to slow up the quantity of deviations. Government bodies also made their own contribution by tensing requirements for airline flight safety parameters.

    However, many modern aviation crashes of our own time are in some way associated with the truth that the fliers could not identify a scenario in which usually the automatics had been behaving incorrectly ‑ in particular, within the recent Boeing 737MAX crashes, within which the MCAS system, without the command from your unsuccessful angle of assault sensor, shifted the particular stabilizer driving the liner right into a dive.

    Thus, considerable studies and consultation services with the involvement of representatives associated with airlines, regulators (including international ones like ICAO), as nicely as the biggest players in the particular aircraft industry, are usually urgently needed in order to be held to talk about the current scenario in neuro-scientific flight security and discover measures in order to eliminate existing crucial consequences.

    Reference List

    Campbell, Deb. (2019) ‘Redline: the many human being errors that introduced down the Boing 737 Max, ’ The Verge, 2019. Web.

    Keane, S. and German born, K. (2019) ‘Report on 737 Max 8 crash blames Boeing design, Lion Air staff, ’ CNet News, 2019. Web.

    Kisesa, H. (2016) Aeronautical information management ‑ establishment, professionalism & challenges. Surbiton: Grosvenor House Publishing Limited.

    Kuklev, E. A., Shapkin V. S., Filippov, V. L., and Shatrakov, Y. G. (2019) Aviation system risks and safety. New York: Springer.

    Lakew, S. T. (2019). A affordable explanation for each Boeing 737 Maximum 8 recent accidents. Oxford: Oxford College Press.

    Langewiesche, W. (2019) ‘What really introduced down the Boeing 737 Max? New York Times, 2019. Web.

    Macrae, C. (2014) Close calls: controlling risk and strength in airline airline flight safety. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Medicine National Academies associated with Sciences, Engineering ainsi que al. (2018) In-time aviation safety administration: challenges and study for an growing aviation system. Wa, D. C.: Nationwide Academies Press.

    Musa, S. Meters. and Wu, Z .. (2017). Aeronautical telecoms network: advances, difficulties, and modeling. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

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    Petchenik, I. (2019) ‘Indonesian investigators launch final Lion Air flow 610 crash report, ’ Flightradar24, 2019. Web.

    Shepardson, D. and Manley, E. M. (2019) ‘U.S. limiter cites new drawback on grounded Boeing 737 MAX, ’ Reuters, 2019. Internet.

    Stolzer, The. J. and Goglia, J. J. (2016) Safety management techniques in aviation. Abingdon: Routledge.

    Taneja, N. K. (2017). 21st century air carriers: connecting the dots. Abingdon: Routledge.

    Timmons, H. plus Frost, N. (2019) ‘How cash and influence moves between the US ALL government and Boeing, ’ Quartz, 2019. Web.

    Wilson, D. and Binnema, G. (2014) Managing risk: best methods for pilots. Newcastle: Aviation Supplies & Academics.

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